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As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other 
assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs. We will never 
ask what a book means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for 
anything to understand in it. … A book exists only through the outside and 
on the outside. A book itself is a little machine. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 
 
 
 
VER THE PAST DECADE, THE NOTION OF ASSEMBLAGE HAS GAINED CURRENCY AS A 
keyword in the humanities and social sciences. Assemblage has 
traditionally been used in archaeology, art, and the natural sciences as a 
term of classification (see Anderson et al.; Marcus and Saka). More recently, 
however, assemblage has gained traction as a translation and appropriation of 
the concept designated by the French word agencement in the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, especially A Thousand Plateaus. In this form, 
assemblage has been increasingly used to designate, not an arrangement or a 
state of affairs, but an ongoing process of arranging, organising or congealing how 
heterogeneous bodies, things or concepts come ‘in connection with’ one another 
(see Livesey; Phillips). As John Phillips notes, ‘assemblage’ is a less-than-ideal 
translation: 
 
Agencement is a common French word with the senses of either 
‘arrangement’, ‘fitting’ or ‘fixing’ and is used in French in as many contexts 
as those words are used in English: one would speak of the arrangement of 
parts of a body or machine; one might talk of fixing (fitting or affixing) two 
or more parts together; and one might use the term for both the act of fixing 
and the arrangement itself, as in the fixtures and fittings of a building or 
shop, or the parts of a machine. (108) 
 
O
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Assemblage as agencement designates connectivity, a productive and 
transformative excess beyond representation (Phillips 108). In contrast to its 
common-sense meaning, assemblage refers to complex flows, connections and 
becomings that emerge and disperse relationally between bodies. Distinguished 
by an insistence on the capacity and vitality of bodies, this understanding of 
assemblage values the dynamic arrangements and organisations of bodies, 
situating agencement as an adaptive, fluid, and ongoing process. In Deleuzo-
Guattarian terms, assemblages involve a continual process of emergence and 
becoming (A Thousand Plateaus 4) and are composed of a multiplicity of unstable 
organic and non-organic elements each invested with the capacity to transform 
the whole (McFarlane 562). What comes together can be any variety of objects, 
practices, feelings and affects, which move ‘between technology (content, 
material) and language (expression, non-corporeal effects)’ (Wise 80). In this 
paper, we seek to illustrate the versatility of assemblage as a keyword in the 
humanities. By bringing together what at first might seem like three conflicting, 
even contradictory, case studies, we aim to demonstrate the potential of 
assemblage as a way of approaching contemporary debates in areas such as 
humanitarian advocacy, popular culture and medical technology. Emphasising 
what assemblages can do, we seek to open an experimental territory that 
becomes invested with affective and transformative capacities. 
 
The rise to prominence of assemblage as agencement can be seen in a wider shift 
in the humanities and social sciences from a focus on meaning-making to a 
consideration of what exceeds representation—that is, from epistemology to 
ontology (Puar, ‘Coda: The Cost of Getting Better’ 154). Addressing the 
‘poststructuralist fatigue around the notion of the subject’ (Puar, ‘“I would rather 
be cyborg”’ 63), social scientists have augmented the vocabulary of structure 
with one of affect, emergent with recent trends in the natural sciences and 
mathematics (see Dewsbury; Venn). According to George Marcus and Erkan 
Saka, 
 
Assemblage is … a resource with which to address in analysis and writing 
the modernist problem of the heterogeneous within the ephemeral, while 
preserving some concept of the structural so embedded in the enterprise of 
social science research. (102) 
 
In other words, assemblage allows us to think outside of dualistic modes of 
perception to focus on the present as emergent. Assemblages can be identified in 
relation to ‘processes of gathering and dispersion’ (Anderson et al. 177). 
Furthermore, assemblage has the potential to reconcile structural effects with 
ephemeral affects by holding the stable and unstable in constant tension (see 
Puar, Terrorist Assemblages; Puar, ‘“I would rather be cyborg”’). In contrast to 
contemporary philosophical understandings of affect as emotion, affect is not a 
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response to an event ‘triggering bodily changes’, but rather, affect designates a 
qualitative change, equally corporeal and mental, in the intensity of a being’s 
power to persevere (Sharp 29). Assemblages are produced and crafted by affects, 
which constitute a finite cluster of diverse entities that can’t be reduced to a 
natural whole, but rather are productive, temporally constituted parts. These 
assembled constitutions and coagulations are, as Bruce Braun argues, a 
‘necessary and prior condition for any an action to occur’ (671). That is to say, 
assemblages, shaped by affects, are the foundational fabric of all possible activity. 
 
Despite the definition of assemblage as agencement that we have traced so far, 
there is a general resistance evident within the literature to providing a concrete 
understanding of assemblage. In their introduction to a special issue of Area, Ben 
Anderson and Colin McFarlane suggest that assemblage should be celebrated for 
its theoretical malleability (126). We agree that assemblage is best 
conceptualised as open-ended and productive. We embrace the uncertainty of 
assemblage, looking toward the creative methodology enabled by ‘thinking with 
assemblages’ (Anderson et al. 175). Following this, we employ experimentation 
as an ethos for approaching assemblage, demonstrated via our selection of 
diverse case studies that demonstrate both the risks and potential of working 
with assemblage theory. 
 
Rhizomatic Connections: Tensions and Multiple Entry Points 
To understand the flexibility of assemblage in application, it is helpful to map the 
terrain of assemblage as employed in the humanities and social sciences. This is 
not intended to provide a genealogical route for the term, but rather, to illustrate 
the rhizomatic connections between conceptions and usages of assemblage. In 
particular, we draw attention to three treatments of assemblage in the 
humanities. First, we begin with Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between 
horizontal and vertical axes, which constitutes the spatial and temporal elements 
of an assemblage. Second, we examine Jane Bennett’s formulation of the 
assemblage as a form of distributive agency, the recognition of how materialities 
emerge and circulate within an assemblage. Third, we examine what we have 
perhaps found most useful in our own analysis, Jasbir Puar’s deployment of 
assemblage as a way of re-thinking representational politics, through 
emphasising how affects modulate bodies. We proceed with caution. As Deleuze 
and Guattari note in A Thousand Plateaus, ‘A rhizome has no beginning or end; it 
is always in the middle’ (25). In the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense of the rhizome 
then, this mapping exercise does not seek to reproduce nor trace a history of 
assemblage, but rather, to reveal connections; we seek to indicate some of the 
‘multiple entryways’ into assemblage (A Thousand Plateaus 12). 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s use of agencement can be seen in their work on Kafka 
(Toward a Minor Literature) and the rhizome (A Thousand Plateaus), as well as 
Deleuze’s individual engagement with Baruch Spinoza (Spinoza; ‘What Can A 
Body Do?’). In A Thousand Plateaus, for instance, Deleuze and Guattari 
distinguish between two axes of assemblage: horizontal and vertical. Though 
different, the two axes are inextricably intertwined (Deleuze and Parnet 54). The 
horizontal axis is composed of ‘machinic assemblages of bodies, actions and 
passions’, a designation of the emergent properties, content and expression of an 
assemblage, the language system to which all speakers of a language belong and 
the collection of qualities, things and relations which exceeds enunciation and 
desire. Deleuze and Guattari argue that assemblages incorporate discourse, 
words and meaning, as well as material and substance, in a temporary cluster (A 
Thousand Plateaus 88). Conversely, the vertical axis refers to the creation of 
territory and involves a distinction between being made (territorialisation) and 
becoming unmade (deterritorialisation) as bodies come together and disperse 
(88). As Wise notes in his reading of Deleuze and Guattari, this process involves a 
constant making and unmaking, with assemblages ‘always coming together and 
moving apart’ (79). Importantly, an assemblage is never still, encouraging 
different capacities from moment to moment depending on the assemblage’s 
passing composition and articulation (Malins 85). Thus, assemblages in Deleuze 
and Guattari are temporal and spatial configurations; bodies are drawn together 
affectively only to be shifted by other bodies—a continuous process that 
produces self-organising differences and inherently transformative potential. 
 
Following Deleuze and Guattari, Jane Bennett deploys this notion of assemblage 
in her theorisation of material vitalism, to move agency ‘beyond human bodies 
and intersubjective fields to vital materialities and the human-nonhuman 
assemblages they form’ (30). In Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things 
(2010), assemblage is defined by Bennett as ‘ad hoc groupings of diverse 
elements, of vibrant materials of all sorts’ (23). In this sense, Bennett’s 
perspective highlights assemblages’ emergent capacities that remain 
paradoxically ‘non-totalizable’ (24). Bennett also connects this perspective with 
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Latour proposes that the social 
should be defined ‘only as a very peculiar movement of re-association and 
reassembling’ (Latour 7). In other words, in understanding the constitution of 
the social, we must take into account the range of associations (or networks of 
actors) through which particular kinds of social relations come together and are 
sustained. As Allison Cavanagh suggests, Latour’s ANT differs from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conceptualisation of assemblage given its focus on parts in relation to 
the composition of the whole: ‘[o]nce it [some object or body] is incorporated 
within the network, it comes to function as part of that network, and disappears 
from view as a discrete object or agent’ (45). By contrast, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, the focus lies with the agentic capacities of non-discrete parts. Despite 
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this key difference, the work of Bennett offers a way to connect Deleuze and 
Guattari with Latour. According to Bennett, assemblages owe their capacity to be 
agents to the materialities that constitute them. Thus, the concept of ‘vibrant 
matter’ recognises the diverse ways in which agency acts and is distributed via 
processes of emergence and becoming. In these configurations of distributed 
agency, matter is constituted in terms of various assemblages with different 
affective capacities, involving both human and non-human actors. 
 
Another important formulation of assemblage, one that we draw on heavily in 
this paper, has emerged from the work of Jasbir Puar. Using the figure of the 
terrorist body as a starting point and following Deleuze on Spinoza, Puar 
considers ‘not only what terrorist corporealities mean or signify, but more 
insistently, what do they do?’ (Terrorist Assemblages 204). Here, Puar suggests a 
shift from moralising the terrorist body in terms of meaning-making, to 
considering the functional assemblage of this body that exceeds representation. 
In this line of inquiry, Puar argues for the terrorist body as a queer assemblage; 
as such, it is understood as a disruptive force rather than as an identity. Puar 
frames assemblages as spatially and temporally contingent entities. Indeed, she 
suggests that intersectionality (the theory that identity is produced through the 
intersection of race, class, gender, sexuality and so on) as an intellectual rubric 
and a tool for political intervention must be supplemented—if not complicated 
and reconceptualised—by a notion of assemblage (213). Critical of intersectional 
methods that have become a ‘pragmatic frame’ in feminist and queer critiques, 
Puar argues that intersectional analysis with its focus on representational 
politics always produces an ‘Other’ (‘“I would rather be cyborg”’ 54). Instead, she 
advocates, via Deleuze and Guattari, a mode of thinking whereby identity 
categories are thought of as ‘events, actions and encounters between bodies’ 
rather than ‘simply entities and attributes of the subject’ (58). Thus, Puar argues 
that to dismiss the tension between assemblage and intersectional frameworks is 
to dismiss how societies of control modulate bodies not only as effects of 
representation but also in their affective capacities. 
 
Drawing on the diverse rhizomatic lines of assemblage mapped thus far, in the 
following case studies we explore the potential for theorising assemblage 
through localised examples. Following Deleuze on ‘theory’, our investigations are 
intended not as an ‘application’ of theory per se, but indications of movement 
between practice and discrete theoretical points (Baugh 282). We take as our 
imperative not to ask what assemblages are, but rather what they do (A 
Thousand Plateaus 257). With our aim of experimentation, we consider 
assemblage within three case studies selected from public and popular culture. 
Each of these cases involves a reconsideration of a particular issue—asylum 
seekers/politics, cultural appropriation/raunch culture and disability/ 
digitisation—such that meaning-making through moral evaluations is bracketed 
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in favour of an immanent ethical approach founded in assemblage theory. In this 
way, we follow queer theorist Janet Halley’s suggestion to ‘take a break’ from 
established metanarratives in favour of new explorations (10). Rather than 
offering concrete moral solutions to questions of advocacy, sexuality and race, or 
technology and the human, assemblage offers a new conceptualisation that opens 
up these arenas for new modes of engagement. Just as Deleuze and Guattari 
contend that ‘a book is an assemblage’, so too is this article ‘a little machine’ (4); 
we argue for the creation of our own contingent territory that holds modes of 
thinking assemblage in persistent tension. 
 
Assemblage as Affect: Pathways to Advocacy 
On 13 August 2013 Amnesty International, in conjunction with the Asylum 
Seeker Resource Centre, launched the ‘Hot Potato Campaign’ (HPC), which aimed 
to ‘cool the heat’ on the asylum seeker debate and inform Australians with ‘facts, 
not fears’ (Amnesty International, The Hot Potato Campaign). The campaign took 
place in the lead-up to the federal election, during which the Labor and Liberal 
parties competed to develop ever more punitive policies in response to ‘irregular 
boat arrivals’, including the infamous ‘Papua New Guinea solution’ and the 
militaristic ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’. These policies represent Australia as a 
territory under threat, and associate asylum seekers with negative emotions, in 
particular, fear. In response to this alarmist rhetoric, the HPC took a ten-day road 
trip during which a food van visited selected communities on the east coast, with 
the aim of ‘giving away 10,000 potatoes and starting 10 million conversations 
about one steaming hot issue’ (The Hot Potato Campaign). The campaign 
materials, including a map of the journey, event dates, ‘myth-busting factsheets’ 
and a selection of multicultural recipes, are available online, and supporters are 
invited to ‘[h]ost a hot potato party, start a conversation’ (The Hot Potato 
Campaign). We are interested in this campaign because it signals a shift in 
humanitarian advocacy from a familiar representational politics which centres 
on the suffering human subject, to an affective politics which, according to Puar, 
appeals to ‘touch, texture, sensation, smell, feeling and affect’ (Terrorist 
Assemblages 194). The campaign builds on intensities: the very concept of a hot 
potato, along with the passions aroused by the debate, suggests a certain 
intensity of feeling. We use a theorisation of assemblage to identify some of the 
ways the campaign opens up a new approach to advocacy, which suspends 
moralistic judgment, and instead uses whimsy and humour to activate affect, 
sensation and creative feelings. But first, we consider the representational and 
discursive tactics used in an earlier refugee campaign as a point of comparison 
with the HPC.  
 
Humanitarian advocacy, grounded in a discursive and representational politics of 
visibility and an epistemological paradigm of knowledge production, typically 
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uses visual media and narrative to convey asylum seeker testimonies of danger, 
despair and bodily suffering (McLagan 607; Allen 162). Testimonies are publicly 
circulated to make a moral and emotional appeal to a ‘witnessing public’ 
(McLagan 609) and to generate certain kinds of emotions, especially compassion 
(Kennedy 259, 263). For instance, a testimonial narrative produced by Amnesty 
International in 2012, Rajeed’s Journey: An illustrated series that shows the typical 
journey of a refugee seeking safety, tells the story of a 14-year-old boy who hastily 
departs Afghanistan after his father has been murdered by the Taliban. He 
travels alone, over five years, through Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and finally 
to Australia, where, in detention, he experiences feelings of fear, confusion, 
boredom and despair. This six-page story, designed for use in schools and 
community forums, is told simply through a combination of child-like drawings 
and first-person narrative. As in Rajeed’s Journey, human rights discourse 
produces the ‘rights-bearing suffering subject’, which is then mobilized for 
political and humanitarian ends (Allen 162). As an assemblage constituted by 
institutions, discourses, international conventions and protocols, national 
policies, NGOs, the UN, refugees, aid workers and the like, humanitarian 
advocacy tends to territorialise and congeal identity under the population 
signifier ‘refugee’.  
 
In recent years, representational politics, which mobilises around such 
‘identities’, has been subject to extensive critique (Puar, ‘“I would rather be 
cyborg”’). In the context of the asylum seeker debate, these limitations are 
obvious. To the extent that people identify as ‘refugees’ and use this identity for 
political mobilisation, they are affirming an identity grounded in a ‘wounded 
attachment’ (Brown). Drawing on Nietzsche, Wendy Brown argues that wounded 
attachments produce ‘ressentiment’, a kind of resentment or negative attitude 
toward life and the other. In this self/other dialectic, asylum seekers may feel 
victimised, and members of host populations may regard refugees as unwelcome 
competitors (67-69). While a representational politics may give visibility to a 
marginalised population and attract humanitarian aid, at the same time 
recognition—identifying a population as ‘asylum seekers’ or ‘refugees’—opens 
them to heightened levels of state surveillance. These kinds of problems have led 
Rey Chow, for instance, to question whether the marginalised subject is a 
necessary precondition for politics (53). In avoiding images and testimonies of 
desperate asylum seekers, the HPC abandons the standard representational and 
discursive tactics of humanitarian advocacy. From an assemblage perspective, 
the HPC is striking for the diverse elements it brings together and the new 
relations and connections it puts into play, neatly summed up in its slogan ‘the 
road to transformation’ (The Hot Potato Campaign).  
 
As mentioned, concepts of assemblage and affect have emerged as a response to 
the impasses and limitations of representational frameworks which focus on 
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signification. In contrast, considering HPC as assemblage allows us to explore 
how the HPC functions and what it does (rather than what it is or what it means). 
Assemblages have both ‘machinic’ and ‘enunciative’ dimensions; they include 
elements such as human and non-human bodies, matter and things, but they are 
also ‘semiotic systems’ which include ‘discourses, words, “meanings” and non-
corporeal relations that link signifiers with effect’ (Wise 80). The HPC includes 
machinic elements such as the van, potatoes, ‘hot potato parties’, humanitarian 
workers and volunteers, members of the public, the potato-boat icon, 
neighbourhoods and sites where the van parks, the journey the van follows and 
the like. It also includes enunciative elements such as fact sheets, a map, Internet 
pages, conversations, tweets, blog postings, YouTube videos and recipes. As a 
‘collection of heterogeneous elements’ that is brought together in particular 
relations, assemblages ‘express something, a particular character’ (Wise 78). 
Likewise, the HPC claims a territory and expresses humanitarianism advocacy—
but with a new affective twist. Whereas a representational humanitarian politics 
uses narrative and images of suffering to elicit the feeling of compassion, the HPC 
functions on a more diffuse affective level. Drawing on this understanding of 
assemblage, we can say the HPC deterritorialises the us/them, self/other, 
citizen/asylum seeker binary generated both by humanitarian discourse and 
state discourses on asylum seekers, and it reterritorialises the asylum seeker 
debate in Australia by re-assembling old elements and introducing new ones. It 
does this in part by modulating the sensations and affect associated with the 
asylum seeker debate. 
 
Although the campaign uses clinical language such as ‘cool the debate’ with ‘cold 
facts’, the iconicity of the campaign is whimsical and the figure of the suffering 
asylum seeker is nowhere to be seen. Instead, the visual icon promoting the HPC 
is a baked potato inside a ‘boat’ made out of folded newspaper. This 
assemblage—in the conventional meaning, a collection of objects—stimulates 
new affective potentials connected with memories of childhood (for example, Mr. 
Potato Head, Curious George). On its website, the campaign invites the public to 
‘Tweet Potatoes’, and other headers include ‘Feed Me’ (links to recipes), and 
‘YouTubers’ (links to videos). Significantly, the language used does not simply 
signify meaning, it makes puns that may encourage joyful sensations or 
irreverent feelings, and invites tech-savvy participants to share the joke and join 
the campaign. That is to say, even the language used in the campaign can be seen, 
from an assemblage perspective, to contribute to opening up forms of bodily 
potential outside purely cognitive determinations—to laugh, to click, and to 
watch. Even clicking on ‘Download Our Recipes’ encourages concoctions of 
‘African eggplant and tomato tagine’ or ‘Sri Lankan pumpkin curry’ that, 
according to the recipe booklet, ‘[go] well with’ sets of myths and facts about 
asylum seekers. Thus we see that in the HPC campaign, there is an interaction 
between the representational (the meaningful, ‘myths’ and ‘facts’) and the more 
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than representational (the possibility of new tastes and sensory encounters); as 
an assemblage HPC combines affective dimensions to effect political 
transformation.  
 
To advance their aim to ‘change the public rhetoric [on asylum seekers] for the 
better’, the HPC uses ‘comfort’ food and the sharing of recipes as vital elements 
for starting a dialogue and opening conversations. Drawing on reflections on 
affect and matter—and specifically, Jane Bennet’s conception of food as ‘vital 
matter’—we can take our analysis of the HPC a step further. Nietzsche, Bennett 
tells us, believed that ‘food had the power to shape the dispositions of persons 
and nations’ (43). Furthermore, consumption, conceived of as an assemblage, 
produces ‘affects and effects’ (Bennett 18). As Felicity Colman explains, ‘Affect is 
an experiential force or a power source, which … encounters and mixes with 
other bodies (organic or inorganic)’ (12). In the assemblage marked out by the 
territory of the HPC, food has agentic powers to shape moods and dispositions. 
As Bennett points out, along with human intentionality, ‘food … is also a player. It 
enters into what we become. It is one of the many agencies operative in the 
moods, cognitive dispositions, and moral sensibilities’ that shape our feelings, 
beliefs and perceptions (51). The ‘agency’ of hot potatoes may stem from their 
glycemic index and their warmth; hot potatoes create a feeling of fullness and 
comfort that acts on us. The smell, texture, feel and taste of potatoes—smothered 
in melted butter or cheese—ignites sensations and affects that haven’t hardened 
into emotions, and may provide a trajectory to shape a different set of feelings 
rather than fear, hate or pity. 
 
The HPC assemblage, and especially the symbol of the ‘potato-boat’, stimulates 
another whimsical connection: by representing ‘boatpeople’ as ‘potatoes’ we are 
being invited to partake of a new ‘affective economy’ (Ahmed 121). In the act of 
eating the potato from the Hot Potato Campaign van, we can think of ourselves as 
symbolically ingesting asylum seekers, who become part of us, and part of the 
Australian nation. However, we’re not suggesting that people eating the ‘hot 
potatoes’ would consciously make these perhaps far-fetched connections, but 
rather that the potato van and the potato iconography works on a visceral and 
affective level, and changes, at least temporarily, the unwelcoming and punitive 
rhetoric of the asylum seeker debate in Australia. The ‘toy’ assemblage of the 
potato-boat also invites us to see ‘boatpeople’ as a temporary assemblage of boat, 
ocean, oars, children, adults, buckets, food, personal belongings and the like, 
characterised by mobility, capacity and agency rather than simply as victimised 
subjects. 
 
While a typical cultural studies approach might argue that the thrust of the HPC 
lies in its symbolic power, an assemblage approach, while not denying the 
importance of the representational features of this example, would suggest, 
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however, that what drives the HPC assemblage is not the representation of the 
refugee—positive or otherwise—but the sensations, movements, and affects 
involved in this encounter. To be sure, the HPC assemblage references a 
representation of the asylum seeker body, if only latently. But shifting away from 
the image of the suffering human body allows an assemblage theory approach to 
examine and explore the affective forces that are experienced prior to any 
semblance of this figure of ‘the asylum seeker’ as a discrete identity. 
Furthermore, by considering the HPC as an ongoing coming-together of various 
human and non-human elements, the effectiveness of the campaign and also its 
implications for how people approach and experience political issues can be 
understood in a new light. Each instance of political engagement is revealed as a 
felt event, not simply one that is rationally cognitively processed. In emphasising 
the affective dimension of the political, the HPC opens up a repertoire of 
capacities—to feel, to act, and even to ingest—that would not have otherwise 
been available. 
 
To return to the Deleuzian question, what can an assemblage do, it is useful to 
revisit the state practices and discourses that create the territory in which the 
HPC intervenes. In Australia, punishing policies such as the ‘Papua New Guinea 
solution’ and ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’ treat asylum seekers as disposable, a 
population marked out for ‘slow death’ (Berlant 102). These policies position 
asylum seekers as what Puar calls ‘dividuals’, people who no longer count as 
‘individuals’ under various regulatory controls; their identity is constituted 
through association with the group rather than individualised constructions of 
subjectivity (Terrorist Assemblages 205). In Deleuzian terms, this process can be 
described as a form of globalised territorialisation where differences within 
populations are eroded and homogeneity is produced. Gordon Livesey suggests 
that ideally, an assemblage ‘is innovative and productive. The result of a 
productive assemblage is a new means of expression, a new territorial/spatial 
organisation, a new institution, a new behaviour, or a new realisation’ (19). This 
feature of an assemblage—its production of ‘a new reality, by making numerous, 
often unexpected, connections’ (19)—is, we’ve argued, precisely what the HPC 
does: it aims to change the possibilities of orientation towards asylum seekers, 
by creating new assemblages. 
 
Assemblage as Present-Future: Rethinking Culture 
We now shift our focus from the politically charged question of asylum seekers 
to what may be seen as a more frivolous, though still controversial, area for 
consideration. We have included the next case study to connect assemblage 
theory to a particular instance of ‘low’ culture, following the call by queer 
theorists such as J. Halberstam to embrace an archive drawn from vastly 
different arenas, ‘in order to push through the divisions between life and art, 
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practice and theory, thinking and doing, and into a more chaotic realm of 
knowing and unknowing’ (2). We contend that such a focus on an example from 
‘low culture’ is an important move to question the moral dimensions that 
pervade all aspects of life and to explore how these might be thought differently 
from an assemblage perspective.  
 
On 25 August 2013, popstar Miley Cyrus performed her song ‘We Can’t Stop’ 
followed by ‘Blurred Lines’ with Robin Thicke, at the Video Music Awards 
(VMAs) in New York. The event became almost instantly notorious, with 306,000 
tweets per minute referring to the performance (Robinson). Predominantly, 
discussion on the event in the media and online focused on the inclusion of the 
dance move known as ‘twerking’, criticised by many as appropriating African 
American culture and/or as problematically sexually explicit. The incident made 
international news, leading other critiques to emerge, including regarding the 
media focus on this event at the expense of other news stories. While coverage 
has arguably reached saturation point, we contend that the emergent 
conversation has been strikingly homogenous and thus that the case warrants 
further examination. Though there has been some debate, the dominant line of 
interrogation has focused almost exclusively on a moral evaluation of whether 
Cyrus’ performance was appropriate or not—a rather prosaic discussion. 
 
Assemblage theory, conversely, allows us to re-think cultural appropriation and 
raunch culture in a way that considers the transformative potentials of the event 
in question, as opposed to the fixed moralistic conclusions already drawn. Rather 
than focusing on an agential notion of the popstar Miley Cyrus who twerked her 
body, we instead look at the assemblage of what we refer to as the Twerking 
Miley Cyrus Body (TMCB). This operation of referring to twerking rather than 
she twerked allows a conception of the event as recurrent rather than complete; 
ongoing processes, affects and other events can—and do—change how 
individual instances of twerking are understood and experienced. This 
formulation also refigures the body as dispersed, belonging to movement and 
connected with, rather than founded in, a notion of the subject. Following 
Deleuze, we move from a question of signification—what does TMCB mean with 
regards to race and gender—to a question of capacity—what transformations or 
potentials emerge through TMCB? In other words, while there has been 
extensive debate about the meaning of this event, instead we ask: what does 
TMCB do? 
 
Vital to our discussion is the idea that the prolonged repetition of the TMCB 
event means that it cannot be considered as occurring at a specific time and 
place. Though there may be a timeframe that has come to signify the twerking 
incident (those moments of the pulsating buttocks at the VMAs), assemblage 
theory troubles this notion of the detached episode. Encounters with TMCB, from 
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the perspective of the viewers in the arena audience, viewers at home, those 
connecting via Twitter, those viewing written information in blogs and articles, 
watching the video via YouTube, those responding to responses, or merely 
meeting TMCB in conversation, continue to proliferate. In particular, moments of 
the performance captured within GIFs on the Internet loop the visual 
information of twerking movements on repeat. This provides a literal sense of 
the TMCB as never-ending, a continual vibration, as always becoming, to be 
encountered anew each time. It is this iteration of the event that draws attention 
to the contingent and always-different assemblage of its parts, which allows us to 
ask questions about what an event is doing instead of what it once did. If TMBC is 
happening again and again, differently in each encounter, how is it continuously 
changing the assemblages it enters into? What effects is it continuing to have, 
and how are its own capacities shifted with each encounter? 
 
From an assemblage perspective, the rate of Twitter responses as well as other 
interest on this topic can be seen as more than just a swell of banal public 
attention. Rather than considering the moral debates contested in these arenas, 
data transfer yields a new kind of significance. Taking Puar’s notion of 
assemblage as related to ‘informational flows’ and ‘an affective conglomeration’ 
(Terrorist Assemblages 201, 211), we might consider the ways in which 
information thickened in the debate around particular notions to re-fix identities 
(the black versus white body, the female body as sexual), and what role 
sensations (becoming hardened feelings) played in this. This approach asks us to 
consider affect in relation to the assemblage as a change in potential, 
demonstrated through things such as: the prickling heat felt by some that 
merged into outrage; the excitement of flesh revealed forgotten as an impossible 
desire or perhaps conceptualised as an exasperating setback to women; or even 
the little to no bodily response in the first instance that increased to numbness 
felt as frustration due to repetition of information, blocking the emergence of 
other stories, videos and status updates. Indeed, in relation to this last example, 
the site ‘Miley Cyrus Twerking on Things We Should Talk About’ has 
materialised, which shows images and articles of recent news events with an 
overlaid image of Miley Cyrus twerking in an attempt to siphon-off attention to 
‘real’ news issues. Seen as part of the TMCB assemblage anew, the effectiveness 
of the site may be related to the affective dimensions of TMCB, which have 
converged into a general state of public attention: the vibration and flow of 
TMCB that sticks onto all manner of bodies and hooks into different machines. 
Flows of information, in this sense, are more than just a means to access the 
TMCB; they are also an active part of the TMBC assemblage, inciting affects and 
movements and emerging as forces in themselves. 
 
In this way, the lengthening of the TMCB event extends as a ‘present-future’ 
(Puar, Terrorist Assemblages 204), a shifting assemblage continually constituted 
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throughout time. The event of TMCB emerges from an affect-infused ‘historical 
present’ (Berlant 9), related to various temporally-construed bodies. The 
coagulation of an idea of twerking has emerged historically with a strong 
connection to African Americans. However this linear origin story becomes 
blurred if we consider the way in which no movement categorically known as 
twerking has been one and the same. Typically, twerking has been signified as a 
movement involving a human subject with parted legs, bent over with shaking 
buttocks. However, these movements collectively termed ‘twerking’ have always 
involved multiple bodies, surroundings, sounds and sensations, which are always 
dynamically shifting. Further, the African American population grouping may 
also be understood as an emergent assembly despite amorphous parts. 
Following Puar (Terrorist Assemblages) on the issue of minority group identity, 
we contend that the connectivity between the movement of twerking and the 
population of African Americans involves a kind of territorialisation process 
whereby movement (in this case, the shaking, vibrating buttocks) has become 
intertwined with a simultaneous demarcation of the body as part of this 
population—the notion that this is how the black body moves. In turn, in a 
political environment where the black body is marked as other, such a movement 
has been (re)claimed by those within the categorisation, staked as a kind of 
capital owned by the disenfranchised—this movement belongs to the black body. 
Thus, for the TMCB to appear in relation to the emergent majority population, 
the white American body steeped in a history of colonial domination, it appears 
as (yet another) colonisation of the minority. 
 
Condemning this connection as colonisation helps to ground and solidify the 
populations in question, and obscures the non-homogeneity and 
deterritorialisation occurring for all instances of twerking, and further 
territorialises black versus white bodies. Given the contention that the TCMB is 
functioning as an assemblage, a non-individuated body, this allows us to consider 
the process as also occurring throughout a range of interconnected non-discrete 
elements. Here, Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the rhizome is again relevant, as it 
refers to the prolific interconnectivity that makes up assemblages. Assemblages 
do not arise from linear genealogical roots to be traced, but rather are 
heterogeneous multiplicities that evolve with ever-increasing connections. From 
this perspective, the cultural reference involved in TMCB is re-thought as a 
transformative connection that might break open that territorialisation of the 
African American population and allows for movement in a different 
configuration. This is not to say that the process undertaken by the TMCB is 
inherently ‘good’ in a moral sense, since the event poses a new kind of 
homogenising force, especially as we continue to rely on identities and the idea 
of a population as a reality, which may enfold the minority population into that of 
the majority. Yet an assemblage perspective asks us to keep in mind that there is 
always a risk of hardening population realness, in the sense that such identity 
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positions represent a stable present and future of ‘what one is and will continue 
to be’ rather than conveying a sense of fluidity or flux (Puar, Terrorist 
Assemblages 215). In this instance, this relates to a risk of solidification of the 
idea that the black body is always-already colonised and the white body is 
always-already a colonising force. 
 
Similarly to the issue of cultural appropriation, much reflection on the TMCB has 
focused on questions of its perceived sexual content. Words such as ‘vulgar’, 
‘obscene’ and ‘crude’ have circulated through much coverage, as images emerged 
of Cyrus’ lolling tongue, nude latex underwear and a giant foam hand pointing at 
her crotch. Drenched in historical-presents relating to American traditional 
family values versus women’s liberation versus new-wave feminism, encounters 
with TMCB have caused a stir from multiple perspectives evaluating the sexual 
morality of the display. A blog post entitled ‘Dear daughter, let Miley Cyrus be a 
lesson to you’ spread virally on the Internet, which argued that such displays of 
the female form mean that men will ‘see only a body that can be used for their 
pleasure and then forgotten’ (Roadkill Goldfish). Such perspectives only allow 
room for a narrow bandwidth of evaluation: either TMCB is corrupt, or it is 
permissible. However, from an assemblage perspective, we might think of the 
transformative possibilities opened up by TMCB in the same way that we re-
thought the issue of cultural appropriation. 
 
Signifiers of sexuality marked out in the TMCB event have been historically, 
rhizomatically connected with populations of women. Here, we can see a fear 
circulating from both conservative and feminist sides of the moral debate that 
the affects of the TMCB may be contagious. This idea is reflected in the use of the 
phrase ‘raunch culture’ in popular discussion of the event—the idea that women 
contribute to their subordination through endorsing themselves as sexual 
objects, promoting a polluting culture of overt female sexualisation (Levy 3). 
TMCB might infect young women, who will then desire to become part of this 
assemblage, evolving and extending the TMCB with their own exposed flesh and 
bouncing buttocks. Assemblage analysis of the responses to TMCB reveals that 
there is also a related anxiety that this event might serve to territorialise 
women’s bodies as always-already objects subject to men’s desires. This isn’t 
even to mention a possible fear over the unspeakable desire from both gendered 
populations that might circulate around seeing exposed flesh mashed up with 
grotesque flailing limbs and the outstretched tongue of TMCB—a desire for 
connection to this body, this event, the perpetual TMCB. 
 
While an appraisal of the moral tolerability of the performance allows for very 
limited discussion, looking at TMCB as a complex and shifting assemblage opens 
up a realm of considerations that question fundamental categories and 
assumptions about history, the present, and the future of the event. We propose 
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considering TMCB as emerging from a temporal intertwining of dynamic 
information flows, such that there continue to be multiple transformations for 
bodies globally. Assemblage theory brings to the foreground concerns for the 
circulation of affects, sensations and desire, and the multifaceted connections 
that contribute to the emergence of events and the responses to encountering 
these. Ultimately, assemblage theory allows us to open up our way of thinking; to 
take a break from moral evaluations and instead consider other possibilities and 
ways of approaching issues in a more fluid form. Inevitably, this leads to more 
questions rather than distinct answers. 
 
Assemblage as Capacity: New Formations of Technology and Ability 
To this point we have considered case studies which have involved an 
interrogation of some kind of direct moral imperative—to safeguard and value 
human life equally (HPC); to curate popular culture in a particular way (TMCB). 
Assemblage theory is particularly useful for these particular cases because there 
is much to ‘air out’ in the way of assumptions and theoretical preconceptions. 
This next case study, however, considers how assemblage theory might work 
when it encounters a seemingly uncontroversial issue. 
 
In a video on YouTube entitled ‘The effects of DBS on the motor symptoms of 
Parkinson’s Disease’ (Johnson) a man sits in a chair in his living room: ‘Hi, my 
name is AJ. I’m 39 years old, and I suffer from Parkinson’s’. He explains that he 
has had Deep Brain Stimulation surgery (DBS), which connects two nodes ‘deep 
inside’ his brain to a pacemaker in his chest. These nodes provide a ‘steady 
stream of electricity’ to help ease some of his symptoms. There is a remote to 
externally control the stimulator, and AJ announces that he is going to show us 
what happens when he turns his stimulator off. First, outstretched hands—
they’re steady. One hand pushes a button on the remote. Hands out again—
they’re already shaking. Soon, there is violent jolting, words become halted; with 
a cramping neck, head pushes to shoulder. The body is unintentionally folding in 
on itself. Another few seconds, and after almost dropping the remote from his lap, 
AJ turns the stimulator back on. Almost immediately his body relaxes and he 
gives a sigh of relief. Hands out again—steady. AJ stands up, and turns off the 
camera. The video has clocked 1,239,116 views, with top comments ‘who dislikes 
this kind of video?’ and ‘wow. Modern day medicine is fucking amazing!’. At first 
glance, there doesn’t seem to be an issue in this video at all. There is little 
controversy in the comments, no scandalous backstory, and there have been no 
consequent political events. It is simply a three-minute video of a man with 
Parkinson’s, showing us how surgery has improved his ability to live his 
everyday life. 
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Herein lies our interest: ability. A traditional, representational approach to the 
DBS-body might claim that the video is primarily about the depletion and 
restoration of identity, centred on AJ’s status as ‘disabled’. It might also argue 
that, as a white middle-age male living in New Zealand, he is not only more likely 
to access cutting-edge treatment for early-onset Parkinson’s, but also more likely 
to escape the stigma of disability as an always-already rational individual who 
deeply desires a socially ‘competent’ body. His appearance on the video is a 
specific accomplishment of a variety of discourses—medico-bio-scientific; the 
‘digital age’ imperative to create and maintain the self through the medium of the 
Internet; etc.—and, in this way, represents how modern Western ideology 
produces specific kinds of bodies. Assemblage theory wouldn’t deny that these 
factors have a bearing on the situation—they certainly impact this assemblage. 
However, such a perspective would contest that we start with these kinds of 
observations as a basis for understanding and critique. Instead, assemblage 
theory would suggest that we rephrase the problem of identity into an event of 
relations. Deleuze tackles the issue in ‘What Can A Body Do?’, arguing that a 
body’s capacity is defined in terms of its ability to affect and be affected. As 
Deleuze states, 
 
Growth, aging, illness: we can hardly recognise the same individual. And is it 
really indeed the same individual? Such changes, whether imperceptible or 
abrupt, in the relation that characterises a body, may also be seen in its 
capacity of being affected. (222) 
 
By focusing on capacity, our attention shifts from taking the content of events as 
the primary site of evaluation, towards looking at what the event does, and more 
importantly, what the event can allow bodies to do (Dewsbury). The event of the 
video is a great variety of relations working as assemblage: movement (shaking; 
not shaking); feelings (distress and pain; no pain and being at ease); objects 
(stimulator; brain; hands and arms; living room; chair; camera), affects (the 
embodied anticipation of turning the stimulator off, then on again), practices (the 
practice of experiencing and reacting to a shaking body), and signifiers (his 
explanation of the surgery, Parkinson’s, his physical sensations and emotions), as 
well as an infinity of potential rhizomatic connections to be made between its 
parts. 
 
Taking an affective approach to the DBS-body, we can see that there is something 
of a battlefield of powers of perseverance, which leads to distinct changes in 
territorialisation. First, the most striking aspect is the violence and speed of the 
effects of the stimulator. Within three seconds of switching off, the body is 
shaking hard enough to make his hands blurry on screen. The hands are an 
especially important part of this assemblage for the viewer, as they demonstrate 
the emergence through its non-presence of the DBS stimulator. They mark a 
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passing of time and become a focus of intensity and movement. The intensive 
flows that travel across the rest of his body do the same: increasingly jolting and 
halted movements and speech, noises of shifting in the chair and occasional 
grunts, squinting of the eyes, the motion of the body curling inward, and 
narration, are all effects of a qualitative shift in capacity. Even the living room 
‘setting’ is integral; it imbues the scene with comfort, safety and homeliness, a 
space dramatically disrupted by the risk of a shaking body. Gravity and speed 
also threaten at the moment when the remote is nearly dropped. This promise of 
a painful future hangs in the air for a few tense moments. Then the loud sigh of 
relief when the DBS is turned back on is the first marker of a new territory—
similar to before turning off, but not the same. While only seconds ago this body 
was curling into a nexus of uncomfortable and debilitating intensities, now this 
body has become capable of a different set of processes. This, rather than 
dispelling the distress of the immediate past, casts it into relief against this new 
emergent assemblage. We glimpse not ‘what could have been’ the future of an 
early-onset Parkinson’s patient, but rather a vivid emergence of how Parkinson’s 
becomes into the DBS-mediated assemblage; the shaking-Parkinson’s-body lies 
just behind the surface of the remote. 
 
Shifting perspective, another vital aspect of the DBS-body as assemblage is its 
capture as a video on the Internet. As in the case of TMCB and extending upon 
our earlier discussion, the Internet introduces a new surface of the event. The 
event—actualised as a screen on a computer, a window in a browser, a rectangle 
of embedded video, and the trillions of lines and packets of code travelling across 
oceans as pulses of light down a cable, converging into a single ‘virtual’ event—
can be repeated again and again. Though one might be unlikely to watch the 
video more than a handful of times, the ability to re-watch is an embedded 
expectation in the act of watching—along with the ability to pause, go back, jump 
forward, and navigate away from the video at any time. And so, even in the 
viewer there are capacities at play, which emerge in conjunction with the 
assemblage of the video. If we seriously consider the Internet as an assemblage 
which intervenes into events like the DBS video, then the event of the DBS-body 
as assemblage becomes a part of a different kind of flow—of movements, speeds, 
sounds, signifiers and territories—that makes up the experience of digitised 
information and its consumption. 
 
Returning to the assemblage on screen, the DBS-body as assemblage also allows 
us to question the tendency to express Parkinson’s in negative terms, as 
disability. Instead, assemblage might see disability as marked by the distance 
between relations. For example, an ‘intellectual disability’ like autism is 
commonly marked as compromising social relations to other humans, and a 
physical disability like paraplegia is understood as an inability to relate to the 
physical world through the specific act of walking. However, both cases can also 
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be seen as productive of new, rhizomatic, relations. Autism can sometimes create 
deep affects, sensations and even novel language between the person and 
specific objects or processes, and losing the use of legs creates an entirely new 
way of moving through space, with or without prosthetics. The benefit of looking 
at the DBS-body in terms of capacity, then, is that what we have generally 
thought of as biological conditions which deplete the body—like Parkinson’s—
can, using assemblage theory, be thought instead in terms of intervening 
formations (such as the DBS) which allow different kinds of movements to 
emerge (the non-shaking DBS-body). Despite ‘the doubt about its political 
“applicability”’ (Puar, ‘“I would rather be a cyborg”’ 50), assemblage theory thus 
has the potential to be the basis of a new kind of politics of transformation. 
 
This still posits a fraught ethical situation: how we decide whose capacities 
should be increased? If we take this approach liminally to AJ, we could seemingly 
absurdly argue that, even though it is a degenerative disease which causes brain 
cell death, the stimulator decreases the capacity of the Parkinson’s to express 
itself in the body. Should Small Pox have been allowed to continue, simply 
because it had such an enormous capacity to enter such a wide spectrum of 
assemblages, and to act on such a variety of bodies and assemblages? Such 
questions are more inflammatory than challenging, in this case because they 
ignore the fact that lethal diseases ultimately deplete capacity (if only because 
they drastically reduce the number of bodies available to act). Part of the point of 
assemblage theory (according to Deleuze and Guattari, at least) is that it doesn’t 
necessarily give solutions. Assemblages aren’t interested in solutions because 
‘solutions’ tend to be given as representations rather than as contingent 
processes. What assemblage theory is interested in are different kinds of ways of 
looking at—and thereby entering—events. Indeed, Steven Shaviro argues that 
assemblage theory, 
 
is not a totalisation, a definitive tracing of limits, or a final theory of 
everything. It is rather an expansion of possibilities, an invention of new 
methods and new perspectives, an active ‘entertainment’ of things, feelings, 
ideas, and propositions that were previously unavailable to us. (148–149) 
 
The argument is that we are much more capable of acting—that is, affecting and 
being able to affect—after approaching the event with the idea of the infinite 
ways that other bodies and assemblages could possibly act. 
 
Conclusion: What Can Assemblage Theory Do? 
In this paper, through apparently disparate case studies, we have sought to 
provide an experimental approach to assemblage to illuminate both the 
transformative capacity of this theory while also exposing its limitations. One 
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clear limit of this theorising is that in discussing and analysing these cases, we 
too created territories and marked out the boundaries of the little machinic 
assemblages we sought to describe. Despite our own forces of territorialisation, 
we maintain that thinking through assemblages provides compelling ways to 
approach numerous events. Assemblage theory brackets evaluative moral 
questions and instead encourages new and divergent thoughts, to yield new lines 
of inquiry. In our first case study, considering advocacy strategies as assemblages 
helped to draw out the importance of the affective dimensions in these 
campaigns, which might otherwise be overlooked from a purely representational 
focus on cognitive-informational engagement with political issues. Further, our 
second case study revealed the way in which questions of culture can be opened 
up through exploring the temporal dimensions of events as assemblage, 
provoking a call to re-examine responses structured around discrete 
representational identities. Finally, our third case study proposed that thinking 
through the relationship between technologies and bodies as assemblages has 
the potential to transform our understanding of disability in terms of capacity, 
and to rethink the limits of the ‘human’ body. 
 
Despite the exciting modes of engagement offered by assemblage theory, in all of 
these cases questions proliferated while concrete answers diminished. One 
might argue that although challenging standard moral evaluations is most 
certainly interesting, in life we find that we are still left with ultimate decisions to 
make, imperatives to act and respond. Here, we offer this: opening up events 
through an assemblage perspective makes us that much more capable of acting. 
Shifting perspective to theoretically consider the role of assemblages and their 
affective dimensions transforms our capacity to act by virtue of bringing new 
ideas to surface. Further, experimenting with assemblage may help move us 
toward an immanent ethic in which a new imperative calls out: to increase our 
capacity to affect and be affected, to open ourselves up to transformation. In this 
sense, we advocate that the challenge to dominant modes of thinking provided 
by assemblage is not merely an interesting approach, but rather is a productive 
theoretical tool. As we have illustrated, what assemblage theory can do is yield 
surprising results that hint toward new directions for matters as diverse as 
creating political advocacy strategies, engaging with popular culture in new ways, 
and extending our understanding of human-technology relations.   
 
Perhaps it is fitting to end our discussion with a brief reflection on the way in 
which this paper also functions as an assemblage. As four authors creating this 
piece, we have discovered that through reading, discussing and writing together, 
the final paper emergent from this process truly exceeds our individual 
intentions. We ourselves have functioned as part of a dynamic assemblage, 
hooking in and out as words have become cut, connected and shifted around 
pages, in conducting an experimental application of assemblage. But as to the 
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meaning of this paper—we cannot conclude. For it is but a little machine, that 
exists outside of us. 
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